

The Consistency of Arithmetic

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In 2010, Vladimir Voevodsky, a Fields Medalist and professor at the Institute for Advanced Study, gave a lecture entitled, “What If Current Foundations of Mathematics Are Inconsistent?” Voevodsky invited the audience to consider seriously the possibility that first-order Peano arithmetic (or PA for short) is inconsistent. He briefly discussed two of the standard proofs of the consistency of PA (about which we will say more later), and explained why he did not find either of them convincing. He then said that he was seriously suspicious that an inconsistency in PA might someday be found.

About one year later, Voevodsky might have felt vindicated when Edward Nelson, a professor of mathematics at Princeton University, announced that he had a proof not only that PA was inconsistent, but that a small fragment of primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA)—a system that is widely regarded as implementing a very modest and “safe” subset of mathematical reasoning—was inconsistent [11]. However, a fatal error in his proof was soon detected by Daniel Tausk and independently by Terence Tao. Nelson withdrew his claim, remarking that the consistency of PA remained “an open problem.”

For mathematicians without much training in formal logic, these claims by Voevodsky and Nelson may seem bewildering. While the consistency of some axioms of infinite set theory might be debatable, is the consistency of PA really “an open problem,” as Nelson claimed? Are the existing proofs of the consistency of PA suspect, as Voevodsky claimed? If so, does this mean that we cannot be sure that even basic mathematical reasoning is consistent?

This article is an expanded version of an answer that I posted on the MathOverflow website in response to the question, “Is PA consistent? do we know it?” Since the question of the consistency of PA seems to come up

repeatedly and continues to generate confusion, a more extended discussion seems worthwhile.

Some Preliminaries

One of the great achievements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the recognition that many seemingly *metamathematical* questions—questions about the mathematical enterprise as a whole, such as the validity of its methods of reasoning—could be formulated as *mathematical* questions, and therefore studied mathematically. In particular, the consistency of PA can be thought of as a purely mathematical assertion, and so one can ask the usual questions that one typically asks of mathematical statements—has it been proved? And if so, what does the proof look like?

To understand the status of the statement “PA is consistent,” we must therefore first familiarize ourselves with the relevant mathematical results. Below, we review the main proofs of the consistency of PA, and then discuss their implications.

There is one sociological fact that contributes to the confusion surrounding the consistency of PA, namely that even though mathematicians will agree in principle that every proof must start with some axioms, in practice they almost never state explicitly what axioms they are assuming. If pressed, most mathematicians will usually say that the generally accepted axiomatic system for mathematics is ZFC, the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms for set theory together with the axiom of choice. Ironically, most mathematicians cannot even state the axioms of ZFC precisely, let alone explicitly verify that their proofs can be formalized in ZFC. Nevertheless, for most mathematicians, ZFC acts as the *de jure* foundation for mathematics, and if someone does not bother to state explicitly what axioms they are ultimately relying on, then we can usually assume that ZFC will suffice.

A ZFC Proof That PA Is Consistent

If the consistency of PA is a mathematical question, and ZFC is supposed to be the foundation for mathematics, then a natural first question to ask is whether the consistency of PA is provable in ZFC. The answer is yes.

This is a good moment to review the definition of PA. The full definition is somewhat complicated and is available in any number of textbooks on mathematical logic, so we limit ourselves to a sketch.

The first thing to be aware of is that even stating the axioms of PA requires describing a formal language. Formulas in the first-order language of arithmetic are strings of symbols satisfying certain syntactic rules. There are logical symbols \vee , \wedge , \neg , \implies , $=$, \forall , \exists . There are arithmetical function symbols $+$, \times , 0 , S , and there is a relation symbol $>$. There are parentheses, used for grouping, and there are variables. The syntactic rules allow us to write formulas such as

$$(z > S0) \wedge \forall x \forall y (\neg(x \times y = z) \vee (x = S0) \vee (y = S0)). \quad (1)$$

Formula (1) has two bound variables, x and y , meaning that there is a quantifier attached to them, and one free variable, z . Formulas with no free variables are called sentences.

Most of the axioms of PA are sentences that formally express very simple properties of arithmetic. There is one axiom (or more precisely, an axiom schema, meaning a family of axioms satisfying a certain template) that is more subtle, namely the induction axiom. Intuitively speaking, the induction axiom says that if P is a property that a natural number might have, and if 0 has P , and moreover if whenever z has P then the successor of z also has P , then every natural number has P . But what is a property?

In first-order Peano arithmetic, which is the subject of the present article, the induction axiom is asserted only for properties that are expressible with a first-order formula.¹ More precisely, for every first-order formula $\phi(x, \mathbf{y})$ with free variables x, \mathbf{y} (here \mathbf{y} represents a finite sequence of variables), we have an instance of the induction axiom that looks something like this:

$$\forall \mathbf{y} ((\phi(0, \mathbf{y}) \wedge \forall x (\phi(x, \mathbf{y}) \implies \phi(Sx, \mathbf{y}))) \implies \forall x \phi(x, \mathbf{y})). \quad (2)$$

From the axioms, one can derive theorems by applying the rules of inference of first-order logic, which are syntactic rules for manipulating formulas; again, these rules are described in textbooks, and we will not enumerate them here. We just remark that PA uses classical rather than intuitionistic logic, meaning that the rules include the law of the excluded middle (which allows one to deduce $P \vee \neg P$ for every P).²

Saying that PA is consistent just means that a contradiction—meaning a formula such as $(0 = 0) \wedge \neg(0 = 0)$ that is the conjunction of a formula and its negation—cannot be derived from the axioms using the rules of inference. Equivalently, since first-order logic is explosive, meaning that from a contradiction one can derive any (syntactically well-formed) sentence whatsoever, to say that PA is consistent means that there is some statement that is not a theorem of PA.

So far, our description of PA has been purely syntactic and not semantic. That is, we have not assigned any meaning to the symbols. Model theory is the study of mathematical structures that satisfy given axioms; to do model theory, we have to interpret the symbols \vee , \wedge , \neg , $=$, \forall , \exists as (respectively) or, and, not, equals, for all, and there exists; we also let the variables range over the elements of the structure X that is to satisfy the axioms, and we interpret the function and relation symbols as functions and relations on X .³

The standard way to show that some set of axioms is consistent is to exhibit a structure that satisfies all the axioms. In the case of PA, the obvious candidate is \mathbb{N} , the set of natural numbers, with $+$, \times , 0 , S , and $>$ interpreted as addition, multiplication, zero, successor, and greater than. After all, \mathbb{N} was the example that motivated the axioms of PA in the first place. Indeed, arguing set-theoretically, it is straightforward to construct the natural numbers, show that they satisfy all the axioms of PA, and conclude that PA is consistent. This argument is easily formalized in ZFC.

It is worth remarking that this set-theoretic proof of the consistency of PA does more than just show that the concept of an unbounded sequence $1, 2, 3, \dots$ is coherent; if that were all it showed, then it would not show very much, since even asking whether PA is consistent presupposes that the definition of PA is coherent, and that definition already implicitly assumes that it is meaningful to talk about (certain kinds of) unbounded sequences, such as arbitrarily long strings of symbols. The ZFC proof affirms that first-order formulas involving arbitrarily long alternations of quantifiers (for all x_1 there exists x_2 such that for all x_3 there exists $x_4 \dots$) express meaningful properties of natural numbers. This claim goes beyond what is needed to construct PA itself.

Implications of the ZFC Proof

Under most circumstances, the formalizability in ZFC of a proof of a statement S is enough to cause people to regard S as “not an open problem.” In fact, the above set-theoretic argument for the consistency of PA can be carried out using much weaker axioms than ZFC, and from a conventional mathematical standpoint, it is just as rigorous as proving that the axioms for an algebraically closed field are consistent by exhibiting \mathbb{C} as an example, or proving that the axioms for a Hilbert space are consistent by exhibiting

¹There is another version of the Peano axioms, usually known as the second-order Peano axioms, with the property that there is only one mathematical structure satisfying them (namely \mathbb{N}), which can be used as a definition of \mathbb{N} . In contrast, there are many nonisomorphic structures, known as nonstandard models, that satisfy the first-order Peano axioms.

²As far as the consistency of first-order arithmetic is concerned, the distinction between intuitionistic logic and classical logic turns out not to matter too much. Gödel, and independently Gentzen [13], showed constructively that Heyting arithmetic, which is the intuitionistic counterpart of PA, is consistent if and only PA is consistent.

³Note in particular that the variables are not allowed to range over sets of elements; this restriction is what makes PA a first-order theory.

$L^2([0,1])$ as an example. If we regard a mathematical statement as being definitively established once it has been mathematically proved, then the consistency of PA has been definitively established. Nevertheless, many people find the above proof of the consistency of PA unsatisfactory. Why might that be?

We can partially answer this question by recalling some history.⁴ Especially during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many mathematicians were concerned with whether mathematical reasoning was trustworthy. The paradoxes of set theory had demonstrated that incautious use of superficially valid mathematical reasoning could lead to contradictions; so naturally, mathematicians were eager to delimit exactly which reasoning principles were trustworthy and which were not. One option was to be extremely conservative, but this came at the cost of rejecting many mathematical proofs that seemed perfectly fine, and not everyone was willing to give those up. A variety of systems of varying logical strength were proposed for formalizing various subsets of mathematical knowledge, and PA was one candidate for formalizing arithmetical knowledge.

Because of this potential role as a foundation for part of mathematics, people did not look at the axioms of PA in quite the same way that they looked at axioms for an “ordinary mathematical structure” such as a differentiable manifold or a Lie algebra. Many felt that a consistency proof for PA should be held to a higher standard of rigor than usual—an “ordinary” mathematical proof might not be good enough, since the consistency proof was supposed to certify (to skeptics who raised doubts about certain kinds of mathematical arguments) that the system was “safe.”

In this context, someone could object that the set-theoretic proof employs dubious reasoning about infinity. Being finite creatures, we cannot apprehend infinite objects in the same way that we can apprehend finite objects, and if we reason about infinite objects by analogy with finite objects, we might be on logically shaky ground. If we reexamine the set-theoretic proof of the consistency of PA, then we see that it amounts to an argument that there cannot be a contradiction in the axioms of PA, because there is an object—specifically, an infinite object, namely \mathbb{N} —that satisfies all those axioms. A contradiction in PA would mean that \mathbb{N} simultaneously has a (first-order definable) property and does not have that property—but this is nonsense, because an object either has a property or it doesn’t.

If you, like most mathematicians, find \mathbb{N} and its first-order properties to be perfectly clear, then the set-theoretic proof should satisfy you that PA is consistent. But some might be uneasy that the argument seems to presuppose the reality of infinite sets (sometimes referred to as platonism about infinite sets.)⁵ Voevodsky noted in his talk that first-order properties of the natural numbers can be uncomputable. This means that if our plan is to react to a purported proof of $P \wedge \neg P$ by checking directly whether P

or $\neg P$ holds for the natural numbers, then we might be out of luck—we might not be able to figure out, in a finite amount of time, which of P and $\neg P$ really holds for the natural numbers. In the absence of such a decision procedure, how confident can we really be that the natural numbers must either have the property or not? Maybe the alleged “property” is meaningless.

This line of thinking may lead us to wonder whether “PA is consistent” can be proved without assuming, as ZFC does, that infinite sets exist. After all, “PA is consistent” is a statement about what happens when a finite list of rules is applied to finite strings of symbols, and if there is a proof of a contradiction, then it must materialize after a finite number of applications of those rules, and only finitely many axioms can enter the picture. It therefore seems plausible that we might be able to give a finitary proof that PA is consistent. The term *finitary* has no universally agreed-upon precise definition, but following custom, we will use it informally to mean methods of mathematical proof that try to avoid, or minimize, assumptions about infinite quantities and processes.

But Wait! What About Gödel?

At this point the reader might recall that Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem tells us that if PA is consistent, then the consistency of PA—or more precisely, a certain string $\text{Con}(\text{PA})$ that “expresses” the consistency of PA—is not provable in PA. Doesn’t this theorem tell us that we cannot hope to prove the consistency of PA except by employing an axiomatic system that is stronger than PA? And if that is the case, then it would seem that we can never be sure that PA is consistent; if we have doubts about PA, then any “proof” that PA is consistent must rely on even more doubtful assumptions. Any consistency proof must be circular in the sense of assuming more than it proves, so not only is the consistency of PA an open problem, it is doomed to remain open forever.

The above argument is correct, up to a point. The MathOverflow question “Is PA consistent? Do we know it?” asks more specifically whether the consistency of PA has been proved in “a system that has itself been proven consistent.” This question tacitly assumes that it is somehow possible to “pull yourself up by your own bootstraps” by setting up some system whose consistency is guaranteed because it has been proven—presumably in some absolute, unconditional sense. But any consistency proof has to assume something, and you can always cast doubt on that “something” and demand that it, too, be given a consistency proof, and so on ad infinitum. Even if somehow you found a plausible system that proved its own consistency,⁶ any doubts you had about its consistency would hardly be allayed just because it vouched for itself! At some point, you simply have to take something for granted without demanding that it be proved from something more basic. This much is obvious, even without Gödel’s theorem.

⁴For much more historical context, I recommend the article by Kahle [10].

⁵On the other hand, some people, such as Solomon Feferman [5], explicitly reject platonism but nevertheless find the argument that \mathbb{N} satisfies all the axioms of PA to be completely convincing.

⁶See, for example, Willard [18] for an explanation of how this might be possible.

Where the above argument goes wrong is the claim of circularity. Gödel's theorem does not actually say that the consistency of PA cannot be proved except in a system that is stronger than PA. It does say that $\text{Con}(\text{PA})$ cannot be proved in a system that is weaker than PA, in the sense of a system whose theorems are a subset of the theorems of PA. And therefore Hilbert's original program of proving statements such as $\text{Con}(\text{PA})$ and $\text{Con}(\text{ZFC})$ in a strictly weaker system such as PRA is doomed. However, the possibility remains open that one could prove $\text{Con}(\text{PA})$ in a system that is neither weaker nor stronger than PA, e.g., PRA together with an axiom (or axioms) that cannot be proved in PA but that we can examine on an individual basis, and whose legitimacy we can accept. This is exactly what Gerhard Gentzen accomplished back in the 1930s, and it is to Gentzen's proof that we turn next.

Ordinals below ϵ_0

The crux of Gentzen's consistency proof is something known as the ordinal number ϵ_0 . Some accounts of ϵ_0 make it seem "even more infinitary" than the set of all natural numbers, and so Gentzen's proof might seem to be even less satisfactory than the ZFC proof, as far as suspicious axioms are concerned. Therefore, this section gives a self-contained description of ϵ_0 that is as finitary as possible. Our account borrows heavily from that of Franzén [6].

I should remark that the discussion in this section and the next is conducted using "ordinary mathematics," and I advise readers to use their ordinary mathematical ability to digest the arguments, without at first worrying about what assumptions are used in them. The more subtle question of the minimal assumptions needed for the proof can be addressed after the arguments are understood. We return to this question in the section on the implications of Gentzen's proof.

Define a *list* to be either an empty sequence—denoted by $()$ and referred to as the empty list—or, recursively, a finite nonempty sequence of lists. So for example, $((), (), ())$ and $(((), ()), (((), ((), ())), ())$ are lists. The number of constituent lists is called the *length* of a (it is zero for the empty list). If a is a nonempty list, then we write $a[i]$ for the i th constituent list of a , where i ranges from 1 to the length of a .

Next, recursively define a total ordering \leq on lists as follows (it is essentially a lexicographic ordering). Let a and b be lists, with lengths m and n respectively. If $m \leq n$ and $a[i] = b[i]$ for all $1 \leq i \leq m$ (this condition is vacuously satisfied if $m = 0$), then $a \leq b$. Otherwise, there exists some i such that $a[i] \neq b[i]$; let i_0 be the least such number, and declare $a \leq b$ if $a[i_0] \leq b[i_0]$.

Finally, recursively define a list a to be an *ordinal* if all its constituent lists are ordinals and $a[i] \geq a[j]$ whenever $i < j$. (In particular, the empty list is an ordinal, since the condition is vacuously satisfied.)

As an example, the smallest ordinals, listed in increasing order, are $()$ and $(())$ and $(((), ())$ and $(((), (), ())$ and $(((), (), (), ())$. The ordinal $((())$ is greater than all of these, and $(((), ())$ is greater than $(((), ())$.

In the literature, what we here call an ordinal is called the Cantor normal form for an ordinal below ϵ_0 , and the

standard notations for $((())$ and $(((), ())$ and $(((), ())$ are ω and ω^2 and $\omega \cdot 2$ respectively. We have chosen our notation to emphasize that at no point are we appealing to the notion of an infinite set. Of course although any particular list is finite, there is no fixed upper bound on the length of a list, so if you wanted to talk about the set of all lists or the set of all ordinals, then you would have to talk about an infinite set. However, there is no need to appeal to such entities to make sense of our definitions.

The basic fact about ordinals is the following theorem.

THEOREM 1. *If a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots is a sequence of ordinals and $a_i \geq a_j$ whenever $i < j$, then the sequence stabilizes; i.e., there exists $i_0 \geq 1$ such that $a_i = a_{i_0}$ for all $i \geq i_0$.*

The alert reader will notice that the statement of Theorem 1 presupposes the concept of an arbitrary infinite sequence and hence is not finitary. We will return to this point below, but first let us prove Theorem 1. I encourage the reader to study the proof carefully, since our later discussion about the correctness of Gentzen's proof will be hard to appreciate otherwise.

PROOF OF THEOREM 1. Define the *height* $b(a)$ of an ordinal a to be the number of left parentheses in its representation that precede the first right parenthesis. For example, the height of $(((), ())$ is 2. It is easily proved by induction that if $b(a) > b(b)$, then $a > b$; equivalently, if $a \leq b$, then $b(a) \leq b(b)$. The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds by induction on $H := \min_i \{b(a_i)\}$. If $H = 1$, then a_i is the empty list for some i , and since no list is strictly less than the empty list, the sequence must stabilize at that point.

Otherwise, let us form the sequence $b_i := a_i[1]$. Note that $b(b_i) = b(a_i) - 1$. Since $a_i \geq a_j$ whenever $i < j$, it follows that $b_i \geq b_j$ whenever $i < j$. Therefore, by induction, all but finitely many of the b_i are equal to a specific ordinal, which we call b . If we restrict attention to the a_i such that $a_i[1] = b$, then each such a_i starts with some finite number of repetitions of b ; let B denote the smallest number of repetitions (over all a_i such that $a_i[1] = b$). Since the constituent lists of an ordinal are arranged in weakly decreasing order, and since the a_i are arranged in weakly decreasing order, it follows that the a_i with exactly B copies of b must come after the a_i with more than B copies of b . Hence all but finitely many of the a_i start with exactly B copies of b . If some a_i consists of exactly B copies of b and nothing else, then the sequence must stabilize at that point, and we are done.

Otherwise, restrict attention to those a_i that start with exactly B copies of b , and form the sequence $c_i := a_i[B + 1]$. Then $b(c_i) \leq b(b)$, so we can repeat the same argument that we gave in the previous paragraph to conclude that all but finitely many of the a_i start with exactly B copies of b followed by exactly C copies of c , for some natural number C and some ordinal $c < b$. In this way, we can inductively construct a decreasing sequence of ordinals $b > c > d > \dots$ of height less than H . By the induction hypothesis, this sequence must stabilize; if it

stabilizes with, say, Z copies of z , then there must be some a_j that consists of precisely B copies of b followed by C copies of c , etc., and terminating with Z copies of z . This a_j must be $\leq a_i$ for all i , and hence the sequence must stabilize with a_j . \square

We have stated and proved Theorem 1 in terms of arbitrary infinite sequences, because that is the easiest way to see what is going on. For Gentzen’s proof, though, the following weak corollary of Theorem 1 suffices.

THEOREM 2. *If M is a Turing machine that given i as input, outputs an ordinal $M(i)$, and $M(i) \geq M(i + 1)$ for all i , then the sequence stabilizes.*⁷

Although ordinals are commonly defined in the literature using set theory, Theorem 2 can be formulated and formally proved without any mention of sets; it can, for example, be phrased in the first-order language of arithmetic, using standard tricks for encoding Turing machines and finite sequences using natural numbers. In fact, Theorem 2 can almost be proved in PA. The full justification of this claim is rather technical, so again we will just sketch the idea.

First, we can formulate a theorem—call it Theorem 1’—that is intermediate in strength between Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, which restricts Theorem 1 to weakly decreasing sequences of ordinals that are definable by a first-order formula ϕ . To prove this version of the theorem, suppose we have a formula ϕ that defines a weakly decreasing sequence of ordinals and asserts that they all have height at least H . Then we can mimic the proof of Theorem 1 to construct a PA proof of Theorem 1’ for ϕ . The only catch is that we need, as building blocks, PA proofs of Theorem 1’ for formulas with smaller H —but we can assume by induction that these are available. Note that this is an inductive procedure for constructing PA proofs of individual instances of Theorem 1’ and cannot be converted to a PA proof of Theorem 1’ itself; however, it illustrates that each instance of Theorem 1’ can be proved without assuming the existence of infinite sets.

Gentzen’s Consistency Proof

Gentzen is usually regarded as having produced four different versions of his consistency proof. Only three versions were published during his lifetime, but the first published version is usually called his second proof, because it involved a major revision of the version that he originally submitted for publication. All versions of his proof may be found in his collected works [13]. For our present purposes, the differences between the versions are not critical, so we simply refer to “Gentzen’s proof” without specifying the version.

Giving a full account of Gentzen’s proof is beyond the scope of this article, because it necessarily involves careful attention to the nitty-gritty details of PA, but we give a sketch of the main idea, following the account of Tait [16]. It is convenient to assume that negation \neg occurs only in atomic formulas, meaning those not involving \vee , \wedge , \forall , or \exists (this can always be achieved, because \neg can always be “pushed inside” at the cost of toggling between \vee and \wedge and between \forall and \exists). Imagine that you are playing a game against an adversary, and the state of the board at any time consists of a finite number of sentences. Your goal is to reach a state in which one of the sentences is a true atomic sentence.

The *components* of the sentences $\phi \vee \psi$ and $\phi \wedge \psi$ are ϕ and ψ . The components of the sentences $\forall x\phi(x)$ and $\exists x\phi(x)$ are the sentences $\phi(SSS \cdots S0)$ for some finite number of occurrences of S . When it is your turn, you point to a sentence ϕ , and if it is a \vee -sentence or an \exists -sentence, then you add one of the components of ϕ to the board, and then you go again. If you point to a \wedge -sentence or a \forall -sentence, then it is your adversary’s turn; the adversary adds a component of ϕ to the board and removes ϕ from the board, and then it is your turn again.

To understand the point of the game, let us provisionally accept the reality of \mathbb{N} , and regard sentences as making assertions about \mathbb{N} that are either true or false. We are trying to show that at least one of the sentences on the board is true by instantiating all the variables with specific numbers and reducing everything to an atomic sentence whose truth can be directly checked by numerical calculation. When a universal quantifier shows up, we allow an adversary to instantiate the variable, since we are supposed to be able to win no matter what the adversary picks. Intuitively, we will have a winning strategy—which, following Gentzen, we call a *reduction* of the initial state—if and only if at least one of the sentences on the board is true.

If we now don our skeptical face and claim not to understand what *truth* means, we can forget about truth and simply use the existence of a reduction as a surrogate for truth. Now suppose we have a set Γ of sentences arising in a formal PA proof. The core of Gentzen’s proof, where the hard work is done, is to construct, in an effective manner, a reduction of Γ . This is done inductively, by showing that if we have a reduction of Γ and we introduce an axiom or a rule of inference, then the resulting Γ' also has a reduction. The punch line is that some sentences, such as $0 = S0$, manifestly have no reduction, and so are not derivable in PA.

The reason ordinals show up in the proof is that they are used to track game trees. In particular, we need to be able to show that reductions always terminate. Proving this requires Theorem 2 (or something similar).

⁷In fact, the theorem can be further weakened to assert the stabilization of all primitive recursive descending sequences of ordinals; see [17, Lemma 12.79] or [2, Theorem 4.6], for example. The fact that PRA plus Theorem 2 implies that PA is consistent is only implicit and not explicit in Gentzen’s original proof. I have chosen this way of presenting the argument rather than the more common approach of explaining what “induction up to ϵ_0 ” is, because I believe that Theorem 2 is more accessible to the general reader without training in logic and set theory.

Implications of Gentzen’s Proof

Gentzen’s proof certainly meets ordinary standards of mathematical rigor, but keep in mind that we are trying to adhere to higher than usual standards. So what assumptions are really needed to carry out the proof? Answering this question requires not just understanding the argument, but also some experience with formalizing mathematical arguments. Fortunately for us, logicians have carefully analyzed the argument, and the verdict is that other than Theorem 2, everything in Gentzen’s proof can be formalized in PRA, which, as we said earlier, is a system of axioms that is widely regarded as being finitary and very conservative. In particular, PRA makes no reference to infinite sets. Thus, Gentzen has reduced the analysis of arbitrarily complicated first-order sentences of PA, and their classical logical consequences, to a single finitary statement, namely Theorem 2. What objection might one have to Theorem 2?

Voevodsky’s objection was that Gentzen’s only justification for Theorem 2 was that it was self-evident—a suspicious claim, according to Voevodsky, since Gödel’s theorem tells us that Theorem 2 cannot be proved using “usual induction techniques.” If we take this objection at face value, then it is at best misleadingly phrased. Gentzen does not say that Theorem 2 (or rather, the variant of it that he uses in his proof) is self-evident; he gives an inductive argument along the lines we have given. As we have seen, by normal mathematical standards, there is nothing particularly “unusual” about the inductive argument.⁸ The only way I have been able to make sense of Voevodsky’s argument is by interpreting it as assuming that a consistency proof for a system can be convincing only if it can be carried out in a system strictly weaker than the system itself. If we accept this assumption, then we can indeed view Gödel’s theorem as a deal-breaker, but then Voevodsky’s objection becomes a blanket rejection of all consistency proofs and has nothing to do with any specific concerns about PA or Gentzen’s proof. As we argued earlier, Gödel’s theorem, which Voevodsky cites in support of his objection, does not entail such blanket skepticism.

It could be that Voevodsky’s real concern was that even though the statement of Theorem 2 is finitary, it does not feel like an axiom, and the only ways to justify it seem to be infinitary. Gentzen tried to argue that the induction needed for his proof was just more complicated than, and not different in character from, the finitary induction argument that every weakly decreasing sequence of natural numbers must eventually stabilize. But since “finitary” is not precisely defined, the point can be legitimately debated. Note, though, that rejecting the proof of Theorem 1 comes with a cost: it potentially means that many routine mathematical arguments by induction are suspect—not just those involving arbitrarily complex first-order properties.

Alternatively, Voevodsky’s real concern may have been that the proof of Theorem 2 is insufficiently constructive, since the stabilization point is not, in general, computable. Again, this could be a tenable objection, but it comes at a

price, because rejecting all “uncomputable mathematics” means rejecting a sizable fraction of all mathematics. A plausible candidate for an axiomatization of “computable mathematics” (assuming classical logic and not intuitionistic logic) is a system known as RCA_0 [15]. In RCA_0 one cannot prove the consistency of PA, but one cannot prove Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem or the Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem either.

Friedman’s Relative Consistency Proof

Speaking of the Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem, we should mention a result due to Harvey Friedman, announced on the Foundations of Mathematics mailing list [7] but not formally published, that the inconsistency of PA would imply the inconsistency of a system called $\text{SRM} + \text{BWQ}$. Here SRM (strict reverse mathematics [8]) is a weak system of axioms that serves as a “base theory,” and BWQ (Bolzano–Weierstrass for \mathbb{Q}) is the familiar mathematical principle that every bounded infinite sequence of rationals has an infinite Cauchy subsequence.

Friedman’s proof is not directed at those who are skeptical of infinite sets or uncomputable sequences, since it uses both concepts (the set of indices of the subsequence promised by BWQ can, and usually will, be an uncomputable set of natural numbers, even if the original sequence is computable). Rather, it is directed at those who feel that formal systems for mathematics are artificially strong and overly general, and who argue that “natural” mathematical statements require only a limited set of induction principles. In particular, they reject the inductive proof of Theorem 1 as being unnaturally strong. Friedman argues that $\text{SRM} + \text{BWQ}$ uses only principles that are routinely accepted in “mainstream mathematics,” and hence that anyone who accepts that ordinary mathematical reasoning is consistent should accept that PA is consistent.

Even a sketch of Friedman’s proof requires concepts that go beyond the scope of this article, but since his argument is not well known, we say a few words here for the benefit of readers with some background in logic. If we replace SRM with RCA_0 , then the result is proved in Simpson [15, Theorem I.9.1]. The key point is that the unbounded existential quantifier in BWQ allows one to construct computably enumerable sets (e.g., the set of all Turing machines that halt) from computable approximations. In the terminology of second-order arithmetic, this lets us pass from Δ_1^0 comprehension to Σ_1^0 comprehension, which can then be “bootstrapped” up to arithmetical comprehension. Therefore, every axiom of PA can be derived in $\text{RCA}_0 + \text{BWQ}$, yielding a relative consistency proof. In SRM , one strips down this argument to its bare essentials to avoid “unnecessary generality,” but BWQ still plays the same role of providing the crucial unbounded existential quantifier. Note that a variety of other mathematical statements besides BWQ could do the job equally well.

Taking Stock

There are other ways to prove the consistency of PA (e.g., there is a relative consistency proof based on Gödel’s

⁸A far stronger induction argument was used by Robertson and Seymour in their proof of the graph minor theorem [9], and nobody seems to have rejected that theorem on those grounds.

“Dialectica” interpretation [1]), but the results we have discussed so far already show that the normal mathematical standards for declaring something to be proved, known, solved, and no longer an open problem have been met and even exceeded. Even those who are doubtful about some mathematical methods may still be able to regard the consistency of PA as being settled.

1. If we believe that \mathbb{N} must either have, or not have, every property expressible in the first-order language of arithmetic, then the straightforward set-theoretic proof should satisfy us that PA is consistent.
2. If we are doubtful about the meaningfulness of arbitrary first-order properties of \mathbb{N} , but we believe Theorem 2 along with routine mathematical principles that are much simpler than Theorem 2, then Gentzen’s proof should satisfy us that PA is consistent.
3. If we believe that SRM + BWQ is consistent, then Friedman’s proof should convince us that PA is consistent.

On the other hand, if we are exceptionally cautious, we might reject all these proofs as using unjustified principles—but if we do so, then we will have to reject significant portions of ordinary mathematics as being unjustified as well.

Our discussion could end here, but some readers may still be uneasy with the reference to belief (in infinite sets or Theorem 2 or BWQ), and the introduction of shades of gray into a discussion about mathematics. Isn’t the point of mathematics to eliminate the need for philosophical mumbo jumbo and subjective, mystical beliefs, and to rely on proof instead?

The desire to avoid (or at least minimize) philosophical assumptions and defend the objectivity of mathematics leads some logicians to a point of view known as formalism. Edward Nelson in particular was a self-avowed formalist [12], and he even refused to believe in PRA. Can formalism save us from having to make a personal decision about what to believe?

The Formalist Perspective

The term *formalist* has no mathematically precise definition. Its meaning has changed slightly over time, and different people mean different things by it. I will give a description that I believe captures the main idea.

The formalist regards mathematics as a formal game played with symbols. There are rules for how the symbols are allowed to be manipulated. Importantly, the symbols have no meaning. If we say that every differentiable function is continuous, it does not mean that there really are such things as functions, and that differentiability and continuity are real properties that functions really have, and that every function that has the differentiability property also has the continuity property. Rather, all we are saying, in an abbreviated shorthand, is that “every differentiable function is continuous” is a theorem of ZFC (or perhaps a theorem of some other axiomatic system that we are interested in).

For the formalist, the only meaningful mathematical statements we can make are syntactic statements about strings of symbols. It is also common, though not universal,

for formalists to say that even statements about syntactic objects are meaningful only when they are short enough for us to apprehend and manipulate physically. That is, formalists are often ultrafinitists. For an ultrafinitist, even a statement such as “ $2^{77232917} - 1$ is prime” does not, as one might naively think, mean that if (for example) we took $2^{77232917} - 1$ marbles and tried to arrange them in a rectangular pattern, then the only way to do so would be to arrange them in a straight line. The problem is that we cannot possibly lay our hands on $2^{77232917} - 1$ marbles, so what “ $2^{77232917} - 1$ is prime” means is just that we have verified that our rules for manipulating symbols such as “ $2^{77232917} - 1$ ” have produced a certain result. Formalists thus not only reject the reality of infinite sets, but they often reject the reality of natural numbers as well. They may say that they do not know what it means to say “there exists a prime number between 50 and 100” other than that this statement is a theorem of some formal system.

One of the selling points of formalism is that it allows us to sidestep questions about whether infinite sets exist, or even whether we believe this axiom or that axiom. Is the continuum hypothesis true or false? The formalist says, ask not whether the continuum hypothesis is true or false; ask only whether it has been proved in this system or that system. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. The formalist thus seems to offer us a way to salvage the objectivity of mathematics in the face of competing axiomatic systems. If you have a private mystical belief in infinite sets, that’s your business, says the formalist, but in the mathematical marketplace, the only legal tender is mathematical proof—the deduction of theorems from axioms, and not any questions about the truth of the axioms.

What does this mean about the consistency of PA? At first glance, it seems that the formalist approach should be to sidestep the question whether PA is really consistent. Ask not whether PA is really consistent; ask only whether “PA is consistent” is provable in this or that system. It is provable in ZFC; it is provable in primitive recursive arithmetic plus Theorem 2; end of story.

Unfortunately, the matter is not quite so simple, and formalists do not react in this way. The issue is this: “PA is inconsistent” states that manipulating certain symbols according to certain rules will produce a certain result, and this is precisely the sort of statement that even a formalist agrees is directly meaningful—at least if the length of the proof is sufficiently short. Therefore, a formalist cannot dodge the question as to whether PA is consistent or inconsistent.

If a formalist must confront the consistency question, then in the absence of an explicit derivation of a contradiction from the axioms of PA, what kinds of arguments might a formalist accept as establishing that PA is consistent?

Different formalists might have different answers to this question, but I would like to argue that for at least one flavor of formalist—which I will dub a *strict formalist*—the answer is that no mathematical argument can definitively establish the consistency of PA. Hence, if PA is in fact

consistent, its consistency will remain, for the strict formalist, an “open problem” permanently.

What do I mean by a strict formalist? A strict formalist—let’s call him Stefan—is able to recognize, and verify as correct, any existing formal mathematical proof, by following the syntactic rules. But Stefan takes very seriously the statement that symbols have no meaning. Just as symbols cannot be construed as “referring” to manifolds or functions or integers, symbols cannot be construed as referring to syntactic entities either. Any mathematical argument that purports to prove that PA is consistent is really just a finite derivation of the meaningless string $\text{Con}(\text{PA})$ from some other strings. Stefan can manipulate syntactic objects but cannot interpret a mathematical proof as saying anything about syntactic objects. Even if Stefan discovers a contradiction in PA and exclaims, “PA is inconsistent!” he will not identify this meaningful English statement with the meaningless string $\neg\text{Con}(\text{PA})$.

Stefan avoids all accusations of accepting “PA is consistent” for unfounded, mystical reasons, but at the cost of throwing out the baby with the bathwater—Stefan also cannot accept most of what passes for mathematical knowledge. For example, suppose we design a computer program to search for positive natural numbers a and b such that $a^2 = 2b^2$. Stefan has no conclusive grounds for believing that such a search is futile. Granted, just as physicists strongly believe certain well-confirmed physical theories, such as the seeming impossibility of transmitting information faster than the speed of light, Stefan may agree that it is a “well-confirmed mathematical theory” that our program will never find what it is looking for. However, the conviction that conventional mathematicians have, that the proof of the irrationality of $\sqrt{2}$ gives us an a priori guarantee that the search will never terminate, is unavailable to Stefan.

Stefan is thus faced with a puzzle that I call “the unreasonable soundness of mathematics.” Stefan can observe that conventional mathematicians are remarkably successful at making accurate predictions of the results of syntactic manipulations, but he has no explanation for this success.⁹

In practice, I suspect that few if any mathematicians are strict formalists. (Nelson was not, since he believed that “demonstrably consistent” formal systems were possible [12].) Part of the reason may be that even though formalists often pride themselves on their rejection of the reality of abstract objects such as natural numbers, they do accept the reality of symbols and the reality of syntactic rules, and these concepts are very close to natural numbers and arithmetical operations on natural numbers. Note that a symbol is an abstract entity. I can pick up a piece of chalk and write “ ϕ ” on a blackboard, and point to it, but the symbol “ ϕ ” is not identical to the collection of chalk particles on the blackboard. I could have written ϕ on a piece of paper, or I could have typed `\phi` into a computer and used \TeX to convert it to pixels on a screen, and if all these multifarious physical entities are supposed to be the same symbol, then a “symbol” must be an abstract entity.

Moreover, in order to distinguish SSSS0 from SSSS0, I have to be able to count, and there is a very fine line between affirming the objectivity of counting and affirming the reality of small natural numbers. For a human being, it is a very short step from being able to follow syntactic rules to reasoning about the outcome, and before you know it, you find yourself insisting that if you start with the string “0” and all you do is repeatedly apply the rule “prepend an S” to it, then you will never get a string with (say) a “ \wedge ” in it, even though all Stefan is equipped to do is verify the absence of a \wedge from the strings S0, SS0, SSS0, etc., on a case-by-case basis.

If someone abandons strict formalism and accepts that at least some types of mathematical reasoning can provide secure knowledge about syntactic objects, then we are back to shades of gray—one simply has to decide what mathematical principles one accepts, and then, depending on how strong those principles are, one may or may not be able to conclude that PA, or some other axiomatic system, is consistent.

Finite Approximations to Consistency

There is an angle on the consistency question that someone who is not quite a strict formalist but who has ultrafinitist leanings—let’s call her Ulphia—might take. Namely, Ulphia might not consider the conventional reading of “PA is consistent” to be meaningful. Instead, Ulphia might regard as meaningful only what a conventional mathematician would call a finite approximation to the consistency of PA, by which I mean something like the following:

The shortest PA proof of a contradiction has length $> n$,
(3)

where n is some number of feasible size. If Ulphia believes in some reasoning principles, then presumably a proof of (3) using those principles (with n being near the upper limit of feasibility) would convince her that searching for a PA proof of a contradiction would be a wild goose chase.

If we let $\text{Con}(\text{PA}, n)$ denote the statement that there is no PA proof of a contradiction of length less than n , then we can ask for the length of the shortest PA proof of $\text{Con}(\text{PA}, n)$. Friedman has proved an n^ϵ lower bound on this length (for some $\epsilon > 0$), and Pudlák has proved a polynomial upper bound. More interesting philosophically is the length of the shortest proof of $\text{Con}(\text{PA}, n)$ in a weaker system, such as PRA, or even weaker systems such as bounded arithmetic. Unfortunately, such questions hinge on notorious unproved conjectures in complexity theory, so almost nothing is known unconditionally. Pudlák and others conjecture superpolynomial lower bounds; these would imply that even if Ulphia accepts some such system S , then any proof P in S that you can show her will only rule out PA proofs of a contradiction that are much shorter than P itself, and so will not necessarily convince her that it is pointless to search for PA proofs of a

⁹Note that the unreasonable soundness of mathematics is not the same as Eugene Wigner’s unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences. What Stefan cannot explain are mathematicians’ purely mathematical predictions rather than their scientific predictions.

contradiction. For more on this subject, see [14] and the references therein.

Concluding Remarks

Mathematicians typically take the attitude that mathematical statements are either settled or open, known or not known, proved or not proved, and that mathematics is completely objective and relies on nothing that is unproven. But what this attitude glosses over is that accepting a proven theorem requires accepting the assumptions on which the proof is based. This simple principle applies not only to theorems that go beyond ZFC, but to every theorem.

We have seen that by the usual standards of mathematical rigor, the consistency of PA is a proven theorem and not an open problem. On the other hand, you are free to reject “the usual standards” in favor of some other, stricter, standards. Depending on what those standards are, you may or may not be able to conclude that PA is consistent. If you want to minimize the assumptions you make, then you might gravitate toward formalism, but doing so might mean giving up much if not all of what is commonly regarded as rigorously established mathematics. In mathematics, as in life, there is no free lunch.

Earlier, we raised the question whether an inconsistency in PA would cause all of mathematics to come crashing down like a house of cards. Would we all be doomed to suffer the fate of the protagonist in Ted Chiang’s short story “Division By Zero” [4], who discovers a contradiction in mathematics and is unable to cope? If we regard mathematics as a monolithic entity with only one possible foundation on which everything depends, then the answer might seem to be yes, but if we recognize that there is a sliding scale of axiomatic systems ranging from very weak systems all the way up to large cardinal axioms in set theory, then the answer is no. If PA were found to be inconsistent, then most likely we would simply analyze the inconsistency and adopt some other axiomatic system that avoids the problem. For example, there exist paraconsistent logics [3] that are not explosive and that can recover gracefully from a contradiction. There is also an entire field called reverse mathematics [15] devoted to analyzing exactly which axioms are needed for which theorems—but that is a topic for another essay.

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